Are we ready to face a new wave of hybrid interference here, in Romania? How do we build a “digital shield” for our democracy? And, above all, how do we turn ourselves, from a classic example of hybrid interference, into a model of resilience? These are the questions I set out to answer in my most recent policy paper, published by the Edge Institute two weeks ago.

As President Dan announced, a special department to combat disinformation will be established within the Presidential Administration. What such a structure could look like, and what roles it should perform, are among the main concerns of this paper.

I reviewed multiple strategic documents, normative acts, and institutional actions in the field of countering digital disinformation over recent years. Apparently, Romania had in force, at the time the elections were annulled, a National Anti-Disinformation Plan. It was, of course, classified. As for the real-world test of that plan, we saw it during the elections.

I propose a concrete governance architecture for countering disinformation on three levels: the strategic level (the disinformation-countering department within the Presidential Administration), the operational level (the creation of a Digital Resilience and Cognitive Defense Hub within the Government), and the societal level (“the antibodies of Romania’s digital democracy”).

Above all, we need a counter-narrative: one that creates hope and generates momentum around a national biography that citizens can embrace. Only through a “soft power” project can we counter this phenomenon of digital disinformation, which briefly anesthetized Romanian democracy.

In the immediate term, several priorities lie ahead: developing a disinformation-countering department within the Presidential Administration; launching an action plan for the National Defense Strategy 2025-2030; and, of course, the need for national reconciliation around this issue.

Through lean institutions, coordination, and innovative policies, we can ensure we have learned our lessons by 2028. Our recommendations set out precisely such a framework for reflection, so that in 2028 Romania will be an example not of how algorithms can distort a democracy, but of how a democracy can be repaired in a digital environment full of threats to its stability.

Link to the Edge Institute newsletter article and to the working paper (in Romanian, soon enough in English as well) in the first comment.