Sovereignty, cooperation, and the architecture of a new transatlantic equilibrium
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Romania must balance EU defence reindustrialization with a U.S. shift toward sovereignty and transactional alliances, according to National Security Strategy – 2025, using its strategic position and growing defence industry to strengthen deterrence and become a key actor on NATO’s Eastern Flank.
Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine marked a turning point for European security and revealed the structural weaknesses of NATO’s defence industrial base. The conflict demonstrated that modern warfare depends not only on military capability but on sustained industrial capacity.
Simultaneously, the United States has entered a period of strategic reorientation that redefines its expectations of European allies and reinterprets the meaning of sovereignty within the transatlantic alliance.
Emerging American doctrine emphasizes national sovereignty, burden redistribution, and transactional forms of cooperation. The publication of the National Security Strategy of the United States of America in November 2025 (NSS 2025) further solidified this shift.
NSS 2025 underline regarding Europe: “American officials have become used to thinking about European problems in terms of insufficient military spending and economic stagnation. There is truth to this, but Europe’s real problems are even deeper. Continental Europe has been losing share of global GDP—down from 25 percent in 1990 to 14 percent today – partly owing to national and transnational regulations that undermine creativity and industriousness.”
As EU member Romania occupies a pivotal position within this evolving landscape. As a frontline NATO state bordering the Black Sea, Romania faces immediate security pressures while also seeking to strengthen its defence industrial capacity and align itself with both European and American strategic expectations.
This article examines the ways in which Romania can reconcile the European imperative to reindustrialize defence production with the United States’ emerging preference for sovereign responsibility and bilateral strategic utility.
The European–Transatlantic Paradigm: Defence as an Industrial Function
The war in Ukraine underlined the extent to which NATO’s deterrence posture relies on industrial capacity. Post-Cold War demilitarization led many European states to reduce ammunition stockpiles, shutter production lines, and deprioritize logistical infrastructure. As Posen (2003) and Gaddis (2005) have shown, industrial power is a fundamental prerequisite for strategic autonomy and sustained deterrence.
Within this context, European leaders increasingly regard defence industrial revitalization as essential for long-term security. The European Union’s initiatives to expand production, improve supply chains, and facilitate co-development among member states reflect an understanding that technological and industrial integration is indispensable for credible deterrence.
Romania’s strategic vision aligns with this approach. It seeks to transition from a passive security recipient to an active contributor by positioning itself as a regional defence industrial hub.
Its focus includes establishing maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) facilities for NATO systems, developing co-production agreements, and enhancing the workforce necessary for advanced defence manufacturing.
This evolution is not merely economic; it is strategic. By embedding itself in Western supply chains, Romania enhances its security, increases its indispensability within NATO, and reduces its vulnerability to regional instability.
U.S. Strategic Reorientation: Sovereignty, Transactionalism, and Diplomatic Flexibility
The United States’ NSS 2025 articulates a shift in how Washington conceives its global commitments. Moving away from the traditional language of shared responsibility and institutional multilateralism, the document emphasizes state sovereignty, bilateral cooperation, and the requirement that partners contribute proportionally to their own defence (National Security Council, 2025).
The NSS 2025 frames European challenges not only as military deficiencies but as symptoms of broader political, economic, and demographic weaknesses.
This orientation reflects broader scholarly debates on the limitations of American hegemony and the necessity of strategic restraint (Nye, 2011; Weiss & Wilkinson, 2019). As the U.S. seeks to balance competing global priorities, it increasingly expects allies to shoulder greater responsibilities, particularly in their immediate regions.
One of the most consequential aspects of the new U.S. strategy is its approach toward Russia. Rather than supporting a prolonged confrontation, NSS 2025 highlights the need to stabilize the U.S.-Russia relationship through rapid conflict de-escalation in Ukraine.
This represents a significant departure from the strategic preferences of Eastern Flank states, which view long-term deterrence of Russia as essential for their survival.
In the context of NSS 2025, the “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine[1] will fundamentally reshape U.S.-European defence industrial relations. Its first tenet declares that European security is primarily a European responsibility, ending the era of default American industrial dominance.
The U.S. would pivot from being Europe’s arsenal to being a conditional partner, offering advanced technology and cooperation only to nations that demonstrably invest in sovereign, modernized defence industrial capacity.
Second, it replaces integrated transatlantic supply chains with strict bilateralism. The U.S. would engage with European industry not just as an ally, but as also a separate entity – a competitor, client, or project-specific partner.
This forces a consolidation of the fragmented European defence sector, rewarding nations that offer clear strategic value, niche capabilities, and unwavering political alignment in direct, transactional deals with Washington.
For Romania, the implications are far-reaching. It must demonstrate sovereign capability and strategic value if it hopes to remain a preferred partner for the United States.
Implications for Romania – Strategic Agency in a fragmented transatlantic system
Romania’s challenge is to integrate two major strategic imperatives: the European goal of defence industrial integration and the American demand for sovereign responsibility and bilateral utility.
Industrial capacity functions as both a military and diplomatic asset. A robust Romanian defence industry – capable of maintaining and eventually producing advanced systems – strengthens NATO’s Eastern Flank, enhances operational readiness, and increases Romania’s leverage within the alliance. As Menon and Rumer (2015) argue, sustainable security arrangements require material capability and long-term resilience.
Romania must also navigate the divergence between European and American strategic priorities concerning Ukraine. While Eastern Flank states favour continued support aimed at weakening Russia’s ability to threaten its neighbours, the United States now prioritizes rapid stabilization.
Romania can bridge this gap by advocating a strategy grounded in credible deterrence: sustained reindustrialization strengthens both military and diplomatic positions, enabling negotiations from a position of strength.
Furthermore, Romania’s geography and political stability position it as an emerging regional leader. As Western Europe struggles with internal divisions and slow defence adaptation, the Eastern Flank’s cohesion becomes increasingly vital.
Romania can serve as a mediator between Washington’s strategic recalibration and Brussels’ institutional structures, influencing EU defence policy while simultaneously attracting U.S. technology and investment.
Ultimately, the effectiveness of Romania’s strategy will depend on its ability to transform vulnerabilities into assets. Defence industrialization, strategic communication, and institutional reform will determine whether Romania becomes a stabilizing power within the evolving transatlantic order.
Conclusion
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has exposed structural weaknesses within Europe’s defence industrial base and accelerated the strategic recalibration of the United States.
As NATO confronts the demands of a prolonged high-intensity conflict, European states face the urgent need to rebuild industrial capacity, integrate supply chains, and develop sustainable deterrence capabilities.
Simultaneously, the United States’ National Security Strategy (2025) signals a shift toward sovereignty-centred, transactional engagement with allies and a preference for rapid conflict stabilization over long-term confrontation with Russia.
Romania stands at a crossroads shaped by the dual forces of European defence industrial revival and U.S. strategic reorientation.
To safeguard its sovereignty and enhance its security, Romania must pursue a strategy that integrates industrial modernization with diplomatic agility.
By positioning itself as both a European partner in defence integration and a sovereign, strategically valuable ally to the United States, Romania can evolve into an indispensable actor on NATO’s Eastern Flank.
In an era defined by geopolitical uncertainty, states that contribute materially to their own defence and to collective security will shape the emerging international order.
Romania’s emerging defence industrial ambitions—particularly in maintenance, repair, overhaul, and potential co-production – constitute not only economic objectives but instruments of diplomatic leverage within a fragmented transatlantic system.
Romania’s ability to invest in industrial capacity, engage constructively with shifting U.S. priorities, and leverage its geographic position will determine its role in the future of European architecture and transatlantic security.
Romania’s geography anchors it in Europe, and its loyalties, to the European Union and above all to the United States, stand as enduring pillars of its strategic calling. These are not passing alignments but the deep contours of its long-term national identity, woven into the very fabric of its geopolitical destiny.
References:
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf
https://www.oas.org/sap/peacefund/VirtualLibrary/MonroeDoctrine/Treaty/MonroeDoctrine.pdf
John Lewis Gaddis, (2005). Strategies of containment: A critical appraisal of American national security policy. Oxford University Press.
Rajan Menon, & Eugene Rumer, (2015). Conflict in Ukraine: The unwinding of the post–Cold War order. MIT Press.
National Security Council. (2025). National Security Strategy of the United States of America. The White House.
Joseph S. Nye, (2011). The future of power. PublicAffairs.
Barry R. Posen, (2003). Command of the commons: The military foundation of U.S. hegemony. International Security, 28(1), 5–46.
Thomas G. Weiss and Roden Wilkinson (2019). Rethinking global governance. Polity Press.
Andrew T. Wolff, (2015). The future of NATO enlargement. Problems of post-communism.
Corneliu Vișoianu
[1] https://www.oas.org/sap/peacefund/VirtualLibrary/MonroeDoctrine/Treaty/MonroeDoctrine.pdf
